Proudly Political
By JOHN DENVIR*

OVER FORTY YEARS ago Professor Herbert Wechsler of Columbia
Law School used the pages of the Harvard Law Review to lob a bombshell into the debates about the role of the Supreme Court in American democracy. Wechsler argued that courts, unlike legislatures, were
not democratic institutions; therefore, only the submission of the
courts to proper legal method could justify judicial review: "I put it to
you that the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it
must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is
involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved."'
Wechsler's "neutral principle" thesis argued that while democratically responsible-that is, elected-branches of government might
properly rely on a particularistic form or reasoning, judges should
only apply general principles which they were willing to apply neutrally across the board to large batches of cases.
The Warren Court was a target of Wechsler's thesis; 2 he made
clear that he did not believe that the Warren Court's activism in cases
like Brown v. Board of Education3 met the "neutral principles" test. It is
true that the Wechsler concept of judging proved difficult for an activist court. The Warren Court wanted to involve itself in political controversies like racial discrimination, reapportionment, and freedom of
speech, but intelligent judicial activism in these and other areas
seemed to require just the sort of particularistic legal reasoning which
Wechsler forbade. For an activist judge, following the "neutral principle" thesis was a little like playing the piano while wearing gloves; it
can be done, but not well.
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Alexander Bickel quickly supplied Wechsler's critique of activism
a catch phrase, "the counter-majoritarian difficulty ' 4 and it has
haunted discussions of liberal judicial activism ever since. 5 Ronald
Dworkin did make a valiant effort to reconcile activism and principle
in his book Law's Empire.6 But Dworkin's solution endorsed an interpretive method which had a superjudge named Hercules employing a
sliding scale of factors like institutional "fit" and "political morality"
which did not seem to possess the rigor Wechsler demanded. 7 Not
only did the Herculean method appear easy to manipulate to predetermined political ends, it was also faced backwards toward precedent
in a way which appeared insensitive to the primary role of fact and
policy in good judging.
Whether a method of judging exists that is both politically legitimate and pragmatically effective is an important issue for American
democracy. Intelligently deciding a difficult case under our Constitution with its copious use of maddeningly abstract terms seems to require a political element which no legal methodology can control.
The implication of the "neutral principle" and "counter-majoritarian
difficulty" critiques is that the Supreme Court must choose between
activism and legitimacy.
Now, Christopher Eisgruber's important new book8 suggests that
perhaps the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" itself is a chimera. He
dissolves the tension between political efficacy and democratic legitimacy by arguing that the Supreme Court is an essential part of our
constitutional structure because of its political nature. 9 The Court is
not less democratic than Congress or the Presidency; it is just democratic in a different way.
Eisgruber points out that defenders ofjudicial review have unnecessarily abandoned the moral high ground by conceding the democratic deviance of the Supreme Court. The Wechsler-Bickel position
adopts too narrow a conception of democracy, one which misidentifies self-government with electoral politics. Eisgruber argues that a
better understanding of "democracy" shows that in resolving certain
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issues, judges can claim a democratic pedigree superior to that of
elected officials.
Eisgruber's argument relies on a distinction between long term
values and short term interests; he believes that most citizens would
agree that on some issues of political morality-he uses the example
of the abortion controversy 1 0-values should trump interests. Moreover, because appointment ofjustices for life makes judges more "disinterested" than elected politicians, judges are better situated to engage
in a dialogue about values than elected officials who are more likely to
be unduly influenced by short term political interests. 1
And while judges are more insulated from short term political
calculations than elected officials, the Court itself is made politically
12
responsive in the long term by means of the appointment power.
Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by an elected official, the
President, and confirmed by other elected officials, the Senate. And
no institutional fact has been more conclusively demonstrated in the
forty plus years since Wechsler wrote than that over the long term
Supreme Court decisions tend to reflect the values of the national
political majority.
And judicial review promotes democracy in another way. Rather
than shutting down the democratic process, judicial decisions, especially unpopular ones, act as a catalyst encouraging a far ranging political debate about constitutional values which eventually influences
13
later Supreme Court decisions.
For most of his book, Eisgruber seems to be calling for the Supreme Court to engage in a free, wide ranging, pragmatic colloquy
about issues of political morality in American society. The Court operates as a forum of higher politics, a political institution which can be
both democratic and effective.
But in the last quarter of the book, Eisgruber changes intellectual
directions, cutting back substantially on his endorsement of judicial
activism. His more restricted view seems motivated by concerns of judicial overreaching, which are usually illustrated by the case of Lochner
v. New York.1 4 Lochnerwas an early twentieth century decision in which
the Supreme Court struck down a New York labor law, which limited
to ten the number of hours a baker could work on any one day. Every10.
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one seems to agree that the Supreme Court was wrong to invalidate
the New York law; it was what we would now call a routine "wages and
hours" law. But, as Eisgruber points out, the conventional wisdom is
that Lochner was "not merely wrong but illegitimate. '15 It is seen as a
classic example of the Supreme Court not respecting certain basic limits on judicial review.
Therefore, it is important to Eisgruber to determine where the
Court went wrong in Lochner. He decides the error was to rely on
broad principles. He argues that in Lochner the Supreme Court went
beyond deciding a narrow issue like whether or not workers have a
right to enter into labor contracts to consider larger issues like
whether the statute operated in the context of a "fair and well-functioning marketplace." 16 Eisgruber points out that this latter question
is "radically expansive in scope"'17 and requires the Court to take into
account almost all labor, property and tax law. So Eisgruber believes
the lesson Lochner teaches us is that "the inevitable generality of claims
related to social welfare renders economic rights an inhospitable domain for judicial intervention." 18

Eisgruber then transplants the lesson of Lochner to his more general theory ofjudicial review. He concludes that while it is permissible
for courts to use "discrete" moral principles in deciding cases, they
should eschew the use of "comprehensive principles."' 9
He describes "discrete" principles as "particular side restraints on
governance" 20 and uses examples to make his point. One example he
gives is the free speech principle that "government should never mandate segregation along lines of race or religion."2 1 Eisgruber believes
that a good example of a "comprehensive principle" is the one the
Supreme Court implicitly relied on in Lochner-workers have a right
to contract for long hours in the context of a fair and well functioning
marketplace.
I must confess I find the discrete/comprehensive distinction the
least persuasive part of Eisgruber's book. In contrast to the exhaustive
analysis he gives to the issue of the democratic nature of judicial review earlier in the book, here he spends little time explaining orjustifying the distinction. Instead he gives examples from case law,
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showing cases where the Court either properly relied on a discrete
principle or properly rejected a comprehensive one.
For instance, he sees the case of New York Times v. Sullivan2 2 as a
classic use of a permissible discrete principle. Here the side constraint
was the principle that "the government must not penalize persons for
criticizing its officials or policies." 2 3 But he then candidly admits in a
footnote that "Sullivan might be also defended on the basis of a comprehensive principle such as 'the government is obliged to facilitate
robust and open debate."' 24 This would appear to put Sullivan in the
impermissible Lochner category.
He then uses the case of Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party25 to
illustrate how the Court should reject reliance on a forbidden comprehensive principle. Timmons involved a Minnesota law forbidding
"fusion candidates," the appearance of one candidate on the ballot as
the nominee of more than one party. Third parties benefit from "fusion" candidacy by identifying their party with a well-known candidate
of a major party; the major party candidate benefits from the third
party votes. But some feel that fusion candidates undermine the two
party system which they believe is essential to American democracy.
The Supreme Court upheld the anti-fusion candidate law in Timmons and Eisgruber thinks they were right to do so because to resolve
the issue of whether fusion candidacies promote or undermine democracy would require the Court to make a "comprehensive judgment about the fairness of the political system as a whole."2 6 This
would entail more than application of a discrete side restraint, it
would, like Lochner, involve use of a comprehensive principle beyond
the Court's competence.
But Timmons, no less than Sullivan, can be recast as requiring no
more than the application of a discrete side restraint-the First
Amendment right of political association does not allow state legislatures to tell political parties with whom they can associate. Under this
reading, Timmons becomes a proper occasion forjudicial intervention.
And even if we accept Eisgruber's assessment of Timmons as involving a comprehensive principle, there is always the question of
comparative competence. Even if we believe courts are not the ideal
forum to determine comprehensive issues like what form of election
22.
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better fosters democracy, their disinterestedness would seem to give
them a leg up on a legislature controlled by major parties dedicated to
shutting down the growth of minority parties. Once again Eisgruber
candidly admits that many experts think that courts are fully compe27
tent to handle cases like Timmons.
In the end, Eisgruber himself does not seem completely comfortable with the distinction. 28 He merely offers it to those readers who
find it helpful. I think that few will accept his offer until he finds some
way to reduce its apparent malleability.
I myself would suggest that he abandon the discrete/comprehensive distinction as unnecessary to his larger theory. Once we credit
Eisgruber's original insight that the justification for judicial review is
political rather than legal, there is no need to have categorical limits
on when the Court can intervene. In fact, the Lochner experience supports rather than challenges Eisgruber's theory; it illustrates how the
Appointments Power acts as an effective political control on the Supreme Court.
As I would tell the story, the baker plaintiffs in Lochner could
claim that the New York law limiting their hours to ten per day or sixty
per week interfered with their "opportunity to earn a living." The opportunity to earn a living is a "fundamental right" and deserves some
judicial protection. 2 9 But constitutional rights are never absolute; we
have to "balance" the interference with the protected right against the
state interest furthered by the law. In Lochner, the interference was
only partial and the state interest in ensuring that employers did not
use market leverage to depress overall wages was very strong. The
Court should have upheld the law.
So the Supreme Court got the balance wrong; courts, like legislatures, will do that on occasion. But the Lochner decision provoked just
the sort of lively political debate Eisgruber says a controversial decision should. And eventually there was a happy ending. About thirty
years later, a new national political coalition took control of the
overtly political branches of government. Not too long thereafter, by
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means of the Appointment Power, a new majority took control of the
30
Court. Lochner was quickly overruled.
Ever since Marbury v. Madison3l there has been a tension in the
American constitutional project over whether the Supreme Court
plays a legal or a political role. I think Eisgruber's insight now allows
us to admit that although Article III speaks in "legal" form, the history
of the Court has been one of deciding political issues. Therefore, instead of attempting to put categorical restraints on the Court, I would
suggest that we should attempt to develop reforms which will help it
better perform its essential democratic function.
I think we should consider three reforms. First, I think we might
start appointing some nonlawyers to the Court. If we admit that the
Court plays a political rather than a legal function, then there is no
reason to limit its membership to a profession which constitutes such
a miniscule percentage of the population. The French Conseil D'Etat
routinely has nonlawyer members. 32 A Supreme Court made up entirely of lawyers sends the wrong signal to the citizenry at large; it tells
them that constitutional law involves technical issues on which they
should have no view. This leads to a citizen passivity which is just the
opposite of what our constitutional culture needs.
A second reform would require a constitutional amendment. It
would replace our current system's granting of life tenure to Supreme
Court justices with a provision for long, nonrenewable terms for Supreme Court justices. 3 3 Here, the trick is to preserve independence
and "disinterestedness" while improving responsiveness. The members of the German Constitutional Court serve nonrenewable terms of
twelve years. 3 4 I would suggest an amendment which limited appointment to citizens over the age of fifty and permitted them a nonrenewable term of fifteen years. My idea would be to create a pool of
candidates who have an intellectual and political history open to public scrutiny and to ensure as far as possible that the Supreme Court be
the last public office that a justice would hold.
If we combine the addition of nonlawyers with the reform of a
long nonrenewable term, we start to create a court of high politics
that can claim a broader democratic pedigree than the current Su30.
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preme Court and will possess greater sensitivity to the current political
aspirations of the American people. I can see judges still being appointed to the court, but also politicians and scholars-anyone who
could convince the President and Senate that he or she would be a
good judge of the proper application of the principles of the American political tradition to current controversies. Two examples of exemplary nonlawyer justices who come to my mind are former
President Jimmy Carter and historian Garry Wills. Perhaps conservatives would prefer a Justice (George) Will to a Justice Gerry Wills.
The third reform has to do with the form of constitutional discourse. Wechsler's "neutral principle" requirement argued that only
rigorous legal method could compensate for the Court's democratic
deficit. But if we admit that the Supreme Court plays a political function, then there is no need for a narrowly legal form of reasoning. The
Court could adopt a looser, but no less rational, form of discourse.3 5
Stare decisis would play a less prominent role in decisions. Justices
should use a variety of resources in deciding a difficult question of
constitutional law, but squaring it with an allegedly similar case decided one hundred years earlier is probably not one of them. This
does not mean that prior cases are unimportant as indications of how
the American political tradition felt about similar controversies in the
past, but no longer would citation of precedent substitute for analysis
of how alternative decisions would reflect our best political traditions
and impact the daily lives of citizens. We should also expand the constitutional canon beyond American cases to consider comparative
materials as well as literature and film as they reflect national values. 36
Often, particularistic balancing tests will be the only effective way to
set out and evaluate all the relevant material. Opinions would read
more like well-written essays in our best journals of opinions than
oracular pronouncements issued from the heavens.
As now, the Court's decisions would be controversial, but more
than now, they would be transparent. I see this new form of discourse
as more a change in form than substance because no one seriously
doubts that current Supreme Court decisions are more determined by
the political values and factual assumptions of individual justices than
35. I resist the adjective "pragmatic" only because its meaning has become so controversial, but I think on this issue the conservative Richard Posner seems to get the better of
the liberal Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theary, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3533
(1997); Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal Theory: A Response to Ronald Dworkin, 29 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 377; Ronald Dworkin, Reply, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 432 (1997).
36.

SeeJohn Denvir, Capra's Constitution, in JOHN DENVIR, LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS

LEGAL TEXTS

1222-53 (1996).

Fall 2002)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM

conformity to precedent. But the change in form would have a beneficial effect on overall constitutional discourse because nonlawyers
would then see themselves as competent to assess the Court's work in
a way that an opinion's formal reliance on the mysterious science of
law forbids.
I can see both nightmare and dream scenarios coming out of my
attempt to stretch Eisgruber's theory to create an overtly political constitutional court. The nightmare would be that the Supreme Court
will evolve from a covert court of higher politics into an overt court of
lower politics, individual justices acting only as agents of the political
parties that supported their appointment. But, as Bush v. Gore37 reminds us, such partisanship is a danger whether or not we candidly
admit the Supreme Court plays a political function.
And while I do not discount the possibility of an overtly political
Supreme Court becoming overtly partisan, I personally believe that
the Court will continue to transcend partisanship in all but the most
exceptional cases. I am encouraged in this belief by my experience in
putting together a list of "greatest" modern justices. Although a social
democrat in politics, I found my list of "great" Justices (Warren, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter) had all been appointed by Republican presidents.
On the other hand, there is the dream that a formally political
Court would be the capstone on the institutional edifice of a democratically legitimate system of government. But this dream is unattainable until we face up to the scandal of how money dominates
American politics. Presently, Supreme Court justices have the same
low democratic pedigree as the elected officials who appoint and confirm them.
But if we-courts, legislatures, citizens-can ever create a political system in which all citizens have a voice that is heard and a vote
that counts, then the Supreme Court might become an important
player in fulfilling the dream which Professor Eisgruber calls in the
title of his excellent book "constitutional self-government."
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